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THE GATEWAY THREAD - AALS CONTRACTS
LISTSERV
From: Deborah Post
[mailto:dpost@WPPOST.DEPAUL.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 3:21 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
I just finished covering the chapter on defenses in my first year
contracts class. One of the cases is about an attorney who leases
a copier for $4500 and the machine never worked. (For the film
people out there, I love to show Laura Nader's Little Injustices at
this point in the course.) Of course we also read Williams v.
Walker Thomas and a case from Delaware about an alcoholic
who loses his house (Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377 (1992)) and
a land claim case involving the Nez Perce tribe. (Nez Perce Tribe
v. United States, 176 Ct.Cl. 815, 829-30 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 984 (1967)). In the course of the class discussion there
were naturally many allusions to the obligation of self-reliance
and some expression of hostility towards practices that seemed
predatory.
I am giving my students an assignment and would appreciate
some feedback from whoever might still be listening out there. I
thought I would ask them to consider the following: What would
happen if we altered the way we think about defenses, especially
unconscionability? The focus is not on the human frailties or
inadequacies of the person who seeks to avoid the contract
(paternalism, maternalism or parentalism), but rather on the
limits we must or should place on the use of power. What would
be the advantages of this change?
Would the distinction between substance and process be as
important? Would we still talk about the "prevention of unfair
surprise and oppression" or the "absence of meaningful choice?"
Is it right that we want rules that do not disturb "the allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power?" Would it be asking
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too much to give them a hypo and have them apply the
unconscionability doctrine as it is now and then discuss how they
might like to see the problem discussed?
Deborah
From: Stewart Macaulay
[mailto:smacaula@FACSTAFF.WISC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 4:48 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class'problem
Power is one of those words that means everything, nothing or
something odd in between. Isn't the problem one of my right to
live in a world based on trust? Of course, I shouldn't trust some
merchants, but, empirically, I am going to trust Wal-Mart, Sears,
IBM, Land's End and the like. And they want me to trust them
and they invest a great deal in building that trust. Indeed, if few
of us did trust them, wouldn't modern merchandising grind to a
stop? But when things turn sour, the work product of an element
of our profession cuts in. The hidden terms and the courts that
enforce it, say that I was a fool to trust the Gateways and others
who reduce the idea of contract to an empty ritual.
Whatever the virtues of Judge Easterbrook's Gateway opinion, it
gets an "F" as a law exam. It is a pitiful reading of the UCC,
ignoring the definition of "agreement" that was so important to
Llewellyn. Maybe Judge Easterbrook's approach gives everyone
more goodies for less, but it means that I will lose and my
expectations will be defeated. If we think that choice is an
important value, we cannot be content with polite evasions such
as: there is a duty to read and understand a document written in a
code (legal English) and buried in a box. The doctrine of
reasonable expectations exists largely in insurance to limit what
can be hidden by lawyers in documents which they know will not
be read and understood. In an impossibly just world, measured
by my preferences, this doctrine would apply to all form
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contracts. Given the cost barriers to litigation, it wouldn't raise
the price of goods enough to matter. I suspect that the impact
would be largely symbolic, but I like symbolizing that fraud from
fancy offices is a bad thing. It would make some corporate
lawyers unhappy, but it couldn't happen to a better bunch of
people. Instead of the "safe harbors" that they demand, they
deserve harbors filled with mines put down in random patterns.
There is a simple safe harbor that they work hard to avoid: don't
try to deceive people.
You could challenge me: Suppose Gateway advertised in big type
as they puff their products, and said "if there is trouble, you must
trust us to fix the computer because you have no legal remedy."
Would it make any difference? Wouldn't customers just accept
this? Would any of them understand what risks they would be
taking? Would competitors jump in and advertise that they didn't
take away legal rights? Of course, this is but a mind experiment.
We'll never know. Gateway and its legal staff work hard to hide
that this is what they are doing with their arbitration clause that
creates a Kangaroo Court. And Judge Easterbrook and the
judges who have followed his opinion tell us that
misrepresentation is the oil that lubricates capitalism. It is okay
for Gateway to hide what it is doing. I ask in class whether
Gateway's lawyers should be disciplined. Of course, they won't
be. Judge Easterbrook has testified in their behalf.
Or am I just old and cynical?
Stewart Macaulay
2000 1149
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From: Alan Hyde
[mailto:Alan.Hyde@WORLDNET.ATT.NET]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 4:57 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
For years in teaching all the "fairness" materials, I've
emphasized the "two-step" under which the victim FIRST must
be placed into the category "other" or "not us" (he couldn't read,
he was young, she had limited options, she had Alzheimer's) and
only then is the transaction evaluated, typically for adequacy of
consideration though often without saying so. I always ask the
class what would happen if the law emphasized, not the
strangeness of the choices people make, but their reasonableness:
there but for the grace of God go I, any of us could have made
such a choice. Why should that defeat relief? Would the law
look better or worse if it were based on such empathy, rather
than paternalism? We could look at how the law treats victims of
pressure with whom it really identifies, like shareholders subject
to tender offers under the Williams Act (who are given LOTS of
time to make up their minds).
That having been said, I'm less turned on by Deborah's proposal
that we reframe the issue as "limits on power." What is the
power that the office equipment rental company has over the
lawyer?
Alan Hyde
From: Deborah Post
[mailto:dpost@WPPOST.DEPAUL.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 5:01 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
According to the case, and maybe it is right, the power is
knowledge - technical expertise. We discussed the sources of
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power in class: monopoly power, wealth, class, and knowledge.
Does that seem wrong?
Deborah
From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDUJ]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 6:25 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
Deborah,
The way I understand unconscionability, it does deal with the
abuses of power. "Absence of meaningful choice" means lack of
notice, inability to understand, and/or no reasonable alternative,
and the first and third of these have nothing to do with the
victim's frailties but only with the perpetrator's failure to give
fair notice or the circumstances that foreclose alternatives. Even
the inability to understand is usually focused on the perpetrator,
i.e., would the drafter of the provision reasonably have expected
readers of it to understand it? The last time I looked at the cases
- admittedly some years ago - they supported this understanding
of the doctrine.
David Slawson
From: Kettering, Kenneth C. [mailto:kck@RSSM. COM]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 6:38 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
We discussed the sources of power in class: nonopoly poiwer,
wealth, class, and knowledge. Does that seem wrong ?
Well, yes... at least pending clarification as to what you have in
mind regarding "wealth" and "class". Can you illustrate what
2000 1151
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you would view as a potentially illegitimate exercise of power in
a contract setting that derives solely from "wealth" or "class"
(that is, where neither party has monopoly power or materially
better knowledge & expertise)?
Ken Kettering
From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDAHO.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 8:24 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: class problem
Isn't the problem one of my right to live in a world based on
trust ?
We inhabit a legal system that permits people to be wildly
negligent with respect to truth or falsehood without legal penalty.
We encourage criminal defendants to announce to the world that
they are not guilty when they in fact are. If I have no right to
trust what the New York Times says on the front page or what an
individual says on the record in open court, I'm not sure where
we would derive an idea that we have a "right to live in a world
based on trust." The existence of a coercive mechanism for
enforcing promises, and the fact that the penalties are
performance-based (rather than, say, penalties for breach of a
moral trust), suggests that what's at issue isn't a right to a world
based on trust, but merely a right to performance. Perhaps it's
better to look at the problem of arbitration clauses more as one
that interferes with what a party thought was his promised
performance than one that violated his right to trust. I'm new
here, and I'm finding this discussion fascinating.
Frank
1152 [Vol 16
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From: Rasmussen, Robert
[mailto:robert.rasmussen@LAW.VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 11:40 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Two quick points. First, I'm pretty confident that Easterbrook
wrote Pro-CD, (ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447
(1996)) so he is relying on his prior opinion in Gateway.
Second, my sense is that, at least for software as in Pro-CD, the
game is now clickware licenses. The software maker is pretty
much saying - "Here's the terms that I am selling on, take it or
leave it." Why isn't this an enforceable contract? Sure, I'm as
good as the next guy at making up hypos (what if one term in the
click license is "you agree to pay me $10,000"), but that doesn't
seem to be what is actually happening in the market.
From: Mark Gergen
mailto:mgergen@MAIL.LAW.UTEXAS.EDU
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 11:48 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@tc.umn.edu
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
I do not know the case to which Deborah refers. Stewart's
message raises the specter of the Gateway case, which I just
taught so my comments are directed to it.
The issue, briefly, is whether someone who buys a computer
from Gateway over the phone, paying when he places the order,
is bound to terms that came with the computer that stated that he
could return it if he did not assent to such terms. The 7th Circuit
(Easterbrook) said "yes," reasoning that delivery of the computer
was an offer that the buyer accepted by not returning the
computer. He relied on ProCD, a shrink-wrap license case
which held a buyer of software is bound to license restrictions
2000 1153
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found in the box upon opening and installation of the software.
Neither term at issue is on its surface all that offensive (an
arbitration provision in Gateway, a prohibition of commercial use
in ProCD) but nothing in the two decisions limits the logic to
inoffensive terms.
We ill serve our students (and through them the world) if we
approach these cases as posing unconscionability problems or as
raising deep moral dilemmas about one's duty towards others in
the marketplace or the appropriate place for empathetic reasoning
in the law. The reasoning, if not the result of these cases, is
objectionable because assent to the "terms in the box" is found
where, under general principles of contract law, it may well not
exist.
A vendor could tell a buyer over the phone that his order is being
taken without commitment and that the goods are being shipped
so the buyer could inspect them and their terms and decide if they
are acceptable. This is what Easterbrook cavalierly assumes
vendors are doing. As far as I know, they do not do this. My
sense is that most consumers think that when they place the order
over the phone or buy the software in the store they have made
some sort of contract. Though this, finally, is an empirical
question of a sociological sort. To test this - and challenge
Easterbrook's logic - you might ask whether the vendor could
contact the buyer and say it will not deliver unless a higher price
is paid.
If there is a contract, then there are several ways to analyze the
"terms in the box." We might treat the terms like terms found in
a confirmatory memorandum under 2-207, which puts the vendor
in a weak position unless the terms are unsurprising (as perhaps
they were in ProCD). There is one real howler in the opinions -
they say that 2-207 applies only when there are two forms (hey,
it is the "battle of the forms," right?). This is just dead wrong.
It would be correct to say that 2-207 does not apply when the
parties understand that one form [or writing or record] defines
[Vol 161154
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the relevant terms. But that is precisely the point at issue in these
cases.
Or we might treat the terms like a proposal for modification
making the issue whether the buyer's silence is assent to the
terms. (Surely the buyer's use of the computer [or the software]
is not assent for that should be his right, however we conceive of
the initial contract.) The vendor is on weak legal ground here,
too, unless consumers actually do understand that by not
returning the good they assent to the terms in the box. If the
contested term is truly odd and offensive, then the buyer could
seek refuge in principles of interpretation even accepting the
vendor's form as the governing written agreement. If the buyer
is unaware of the term, and the vendor would reasonably expect
buyers to be unaware of the term because it is odd and hidden,
then it is not a term of the contract. This takes you into the parol
evidence rule and rules of interpretation and their relationship.
Resort is needed to the unconscionability doctrine only when you
must concede that the consumer knew or should have known of
the contested term and acted in a way that a reasonable person
would construe as his assent to that term. Even in these
circumstances, I would look to other doctrines - the presumption
against forfeiture, fiduciary duty, abuse of confidential
relationship, and good faith - first.
From: Tom Stipanowich [mailto:tstipano@POP.UKY.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:21 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Mark Gergen's observations are right on the mark. We just
covered ProCD and Hill v. Gateway 2000 in my first year sales
class and brought out Easterbrook's blithe misstatement of 2-207
and the underlying policy implications.
2000 1155
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From: Joseph Perillo
[mailto:jperillo@MAIL.LAWNET.FORDHAM.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:23 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
To add to Mark Gergen's observations, has anyone seen Brower
v. Gateway 2000, 676 NYS2d 569 (App.Div.)? It follows the
7th Circuit but then takes up the same arbitration clause under an
unconscionability lens.
Joseph
From: Flechtner, Harry
[mailto:FLECHTNER@LAW.PITT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:25 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Ken,
I think you have stated the case for the Gateway analysis quite
well. The problem I have is that vendors bank on the fact that
buyers will not bother to read or fathom the significance of the
terms, and certainly won't bother to pack the computer up and
send it back - not when they've spent considerable time and effort
deciding what they want, ordering, waiting for the shipment to
arrive, etc.... It is the abuse of this "inertia" against returning a
product that prompted Congress to outlaw the practice of mailing
out unordered merchandise and then billing the recipient unless
the item was returned within a specified period. See 39 U.S.C. §
3009.
1156 [Vol 16
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If the Gateway procedure is a valid way of procuring "assent" to
terms, it ought to work the other way also. Supppose I order a
computer, receive it and get the inevitable terms in the box. I
then send the vendor my own form, saying "I received the
computer and notice you have included some terms not
previously revealed to me. I do not wish to purchase the
computer on those terms but would be happy to purchase on the
terms printed below. If you do not wish to sell me the computer
on the terms I propose, please send someone over in the next 30
days to box up the machine and take it away." The terms printed
below would, of course, be favorable to the buyer. Why should
this not hold up under the Gateway analysis? If not arranging to
return the goods is acceptance of an offer by the buyer, why
should the same thing not be an acceptance of a counter offer by
the vendor?
Harry Flechtner
From: Kettering, Kenneth C. [mailto:kck@RSSM.COM'J
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:28 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
A vendor could tell a buyer over the phone that his order is being
taken without commitment and that the goods are being shipped
so the buyer could inspect them and their terms and decide if they
are acceptable. This is what Easterbrook and Posner cavalierly
assume vendors are doing. As far as I klnow, they do not do this.
On the contrary. The hardware in the Gateway case was sold on
the terms, very standard in the industry, that the buyer could
return the product within 30 days for a full refund, no questions
asked. The buyer thus had 30 days to ponder the warranty
terms, etc. before being bound to the transaction. Ditto for
software sold on a shrinkwrap/clickwrap basis. Typically there is
some no-questions-asked return period, but at a minimum these
2000 1157
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licenses allow the customer a chance to review before becoming
bound to keep the software. E.g., the famous initial splash
screen that recites the license terms and states that "if you agree
to these terms, click 'I accept'; if you don't agree, cease
installation now and return the disk to your vendor for a full
refund."
Under the Gateway/shrinkwrap/clickwrap model of contracting,
the customer in effect initially has an option to purchase, together
with the right to possess and use while studying the terms of
purchase and deciding whether to exercise the option. That's not
the terminology the parties use, of course, but essentially that's
what is going on. The point is that the customer is not bound by
terms that the customer hasn't had an opportunity to read and
study.
Of course, the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act
(UCITA) § 211 now explicitly validates this model of contracting
re:software.
Ken Kettering
From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:38 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
As Stewart Macauley said, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations covers this kind of situation. As he also said,
however, the doctrine exists mostly in insurance law. But it
exists for all contracts in many more states than people generally
realize. See my book in this respect, Binding Promises: The
Late 20th Century Reformation of Contract Law 44-73 (Princeton
1996).
David Slawson
[Vol 161158
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From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 12:45 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
The idea that business buyers "ponder the terms" of the standard
contracts they receive is unrealistic. Have any of you ever
worked in, or observed, a receiving "dock" for a large business
organization? They sometimes receive hundreds of packages a
day, and they are almost always unwrapped and examined by
very low-level employees or, at best, by engineers, etc., who
have neither the time nor the expertise to "ponder" a lot of small
print. All this, to say nothing of the absence of reasonable
alternatives. Usually, every seller of the same product will have
similarly one-sided terms.
Any way you look at it, there is no meaningful consent.
David Slawson
From: Kettering, Kenneth C. [mailto:kck@RSSM.COM]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:00 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Rather than focus on the empirical point involved (in any
organization I've ever seen, it isn't the loading dock employees
who make the decision whether to hold on to a product or return
it; and I certainly have seen standard terms negotiated), I will
simply note that this argument has nothing in particular to do
with the distinctive features of the Gateway/shrinkwrap/clickwrap
model of contracting. It applies with equal force to all mass-
produced goods sold on standard terms, even under the
traditional model where the buyer can pick the thing off the shelf,
examine the warranty terms, etc. The implication of this
11592000
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argument is that it is simply impossible to have valid warranty
disclaimers, etc. in such situations for want of "meaningful
consent" (few people read the legal terms when buying under the
traditional model; and even were the vendor to decline to sell
unless the buyer initialed each paragraph of the sales terms, the
buyer still wouldn't have "meaningfully consented" because s/he
has "no reasonable alternatives").
The death of contract indeed.
Ken Kettering
From: Thomas Joo [mailto:twjoo@UCDAVIS.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:05 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
As Prof. Gergen points out, Judge Easterbrook certainly makes it
seem as if Gateway's arbitration provision is inoffensive.
Arbitration, shmarbitration. But Judge E never tells us what the
clause said.
A New York case looked more closely at the same arbitration
clause and was offended. (Brower v Gateway, 246 A2d 246
(1998)) According to the clause, arbitration was subject to the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. The ICC is
located in France (although the actual forum was, appropriately
enough, Chicago), and the plaintiffs alleged it was very difficult
to contact ICC or obtain its rules. Moreover, ICC rules required
a $4000 advance deposit, of which $2000 was nonrefundable.
Given the cost of a home computer, this is pretty steep. The NY
court found the requirement of arbitration before the ICC thus
effectively denied the plaintiffs a forum and held it substantively
unconscionable (and pointed out that the Hill court did not
mention this issue).
As to Prof. Rasmussen's comment, not a response but a tangent:
1160 [Vol 16
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/9
COMMON SENSE IN COATRACTS
Regardless of how you feel about clickware, note that ProCD
(yes, Judge E wrote it) was not a click case. The software was
on a CD, sold in a store inside a sealed box. Unlike clickware
terms, which you can see before clicking, the terms were inside
the box and invisible until the CD was paid for, taken home from
the store, and opened - arguably,"after" the "contract" had been
formed between buyer and vendor (Judge E calls this a "Shrink-
wrap license" - but I think he misuses the term. I think a
"shrink-wrap license" is one that is shrink-wrapped to the
"outside" of the package precisely so it can be read before
purchase). ProCD, even more than Gateway, was a clear case of
"pay now, terms later."
So the enforcement of click licenses fits easily within formal
assent doctrine, but ProCD is a tougher fit.
Thomas Joo
From: Tom Stipanowich [mailto:tstipano@POP.UKY.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:09 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
David,
Since reading your earlier work on reasonable expectations I
have been intrigued by uses for the concept. Given my focus on
arbitration and ADR, I see a strong analogy to the problems
associated with insurance transactions. Among boilerplate
provisions, arbitration terms are particularly arcane. It is totally
unrealistic to expect members of the public (or even some
lawyers) to understand all of the implications of an arbitration
agreement and address the option in the contracting process.
While arbitration is not inherently good or bad, dispute resolution
provisions provide a mechanism for overreaching. Thus far,
unconscionability has been the primary tool for courts seeking to
address overreaching in this area. I, for one, believe reasonable
2000 1161
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expectations fits even better. Recently, a national consumer
disputes advisory group (including members of a number of
national and state agencies, consumer groups, and corporations)
developed a Consumer Due Process Protocol for the use of ADR
provisions in consumer contracts. Hopefully, such "community
standards" will inform courts attempting to give content to
"reasonable expectations" in this arena.
Tom Stipanowich
From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:28 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Tom,
Thanks for telling me about this. It sounds like a hopeful step.
David Slawson
From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDUJ
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:52 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Ken,
The doctrine of reasonable expectations does not eliminate a
seller's right to set any terms it likes. It only requires that the
terms be made understandable to buyers before they become
bound to them. For example, if computers of a certain kind
generally last for 3 years under normal use, buyers will
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reasonably expect this, and it will therefore be part of the
contract of sale unless the manufacturer acts affirmatively to
change these reasonable expectations "before" buyers of its
computers become bound, "as a practical matter," to the
contract's terms. The manufacturer could change buyers'
reasonable expectations of its computers, for example, by saying
"in a prominent manner" in its advertisements, catalogues, etc.,
that they are only warranted to last X days, or whatever.
However, some aspects of contracts are simply too complicated
for the buyers concerned to be reasonably expected to
understand. The way that the courts handle such aspects of
insurance is to make laws of them (generally sounding in tort).
For example, it is the law that a liability insurer must accept a
reasonable settlement offer from a liability claimant.
I should add that courts should only make these laws as a last
resort. If private organizations, administrative agencies, etc.
exist or can be created for the purpose, they may be able to do
the job for a particular industry more effectively.
I should also add that I realize that reasonable expectations won't
solve all our problems. But what legal doctrine does? Thanks
for your comments.
David Slawson
From: Kettering, Kenneth C. [mailto:kck@RSSM.COM]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 2:06 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Hmmm. Judging by early returns I seem to be in the minority
here [dodging another brickbat]. Let me respond to Harry's
thoughtful message, then I shall shut up, at least for a while, and
see if anyone else wants to carry the ball.
11632000
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1. The problem I have is that vendors arrange things this way
because they bank on the fact that buyers will not bother to read
or fathom the significance of the terms, and certainly won't go to
the bother of packing the computer up and sending it back - not
when they've spent considerable time and effort deciding what
they want, ordering, waiting for the shipment to arrive, etc. It is
the abuse of this "inertia" against returning a product that
prompted Congress to outlaw the practice of Inailing out
unordered merchandise and then billing the recipient unless the
item iwas returned within a specified period.
a. The unordered merchandise situation is quite different in
that it is, by definition, a wholly unprovoked bombardment of
someone who is minding his/her own business. Under the
Gateway model, by contrast, the buyer takes the initiative and
orders the goods. The one thing every buyer in that situation
knows is that s/he has a 30 day free trial period (indeed, surely
buyers consider that to be a positive rather than a negative
feature). Surely it should not startle a buyer to expect that
sometimes it may be a good idea to take advantage of that
feature.
b. The fact that a buyer does bear some incidental costs if
s/he decides to walk away from the transaction does give rise to
reasonable concerns. That was one of the big battles in UCITA,
of course, and as a result the "mass market license" provision
was written to require (in effect) the vendor to pay the costs of
shipment, if return to the vendor is required. I don't know
whether Gateway agreed to pick up the cost of shipping in Hill v.
Gateway. I don't think Easterbrook's opinion referred to this
point, though to my mind it is a significant feature. (I personally
bought a computer from Gateway some years ago, it happens,
and I'm pretty sure that they agreed to pick up the cost of
shipping. I had to return a defective hard drive a year or so after
I bought it, and I am certain that they paid the shipping for that.)
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However, query how significant shipping costs ought to be
before one should make this point dispositive. After all, under
the Gateway model, the customer has an option; and nobody
should expect an option to be costless.
c. You say: "vendors arrange things this way because they
bank on the fact that buyers will not bother to read or fathom the
significance of the terms". I don't see why you are so confident
that the Gateways of this world have sinister motives for adopting
this business model. Given that parties want to deal through the
mail rather than face to face, and thereby reap the benefits of
avoiding investment in bricks and mortar (a very substantial cost
saving, last time I priced a computer), what are the Gateways of
this world supposed to do? Decline to sell until the customer has
sat through a recording reciting all the warranty terms? Decline
to sell until the customer has received a written contract in the
mail, signed it and returned it? That's the last thing any
customer wants, let alone Gateway. [I have no doubt that if the
customer had asked, Gateway would have sent its standard terms
to the customer before the customer placed his or her buy order.
I also have no doubt that the number of customers who ever
asked for such a thing could be counted on the fingers of one
hand.]
d. The focus on the process by which the terms are
communicated to the buyer before the buyer makes the final
decision -whether to consummate the purchase seems to me
ultimately a red herring. As you state, in most cases "buyers
will not bother to read or fathom the significance of the terms."
I agree. But, as I noted in an earlier post, that's the case no
matter how or when the terms are communicated; it's not a
problem with the Gateway model of contracting. People rarely
do read the terms when buying goods off the shelf, even if the
terms are right under their nose.
2. Suppose I order a computer, receive it and get the
inevitable terms in the box. I then send the vendor my owv pre-
prepared form, saying, '7 received the computer and notice you
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have included some terms not previously revealed to me. I do not
wish to purchase the computer on those terms but would be happy
to purchase on the terms printed below. If you do not wish to sell
me the computer on the terms I propose, please send someone
over in the next 30 days to box up the machine and take it away."
The terms printed below would, of course, be favorable to the
buyer. Whly should this not hold up under the Gateway analysis?
The two situations are not symmetrical. At the time the customer
places the order with Gateway, both the customer and Gateway
know that Gateway's terms will be in the box, and that s/he has
30 days to return. By contrast, Gateway has no knowledge that
customer is putting any strings on the deal.
The situation would become symmetrical only if the facts were
such that the customer "when placing the order" told the
Gateway order-taker: "I reject any terms you may place in the
box. Here are the terms on which I will agree to accept the
computer [reads terms]. By shipping the computer you agree to
my terms. If you ship anyway, I will nevertheless allow you 30
days in which to ponder the matter and, if you like, come and
take the computer away." Nothing stops the customer from
offering to deal on those terms, but of course the Gateway order-
taker will politely tell the customer to get lost. (I'd like to try
this and see how the order-taker would respond. "Thank you,
sir, but I don't think we can do that. Perhaps you should try
Dell, whose number is ..... )
Ken Kettering
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From: Jean Braucher
[mailto:braucher@NT.LAW.ARIZONA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 3:03 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Brower v. Gateway, while a wonderful symbolic victory, has to
count as a consumer loss as far as the result for the plaintiffs in
the case. Like Hill v. Gateway, this was a class action for
consumer fraud (the claim in both cases was that Gateway
advertised one product and shipped a lower grade one to
hundreds of consumers). Rather than satisfying its customers,
which one would expect of a reputable business, Gateway
responded to the fraud actions by asserting the arbitration clause.
The court didn't like the particular arbitration system, but rather
than throw out the term, the court cut it down to cheaper and
nearer arbitration. But a class action still wasn't permitted under
the substituted system's rules. Without a class action, dispute
resolution wasn't affordable because each consumer's claim was
for about $300 (real money when hundreds of plaintiffs join
together). Arbitration systems all have rules against class
actions. This satisfies the demand of a segment of their
customers -- the repeat players who draft form contracts.
Consumer "choice" of arbitration can only be meaningful if it is
a post-dispute choice, when the consumer is represented by
counsel who can evaluate the system's rules. The best way to
reform arbitration systems is to make pre-dispute arbitration
clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts, so that the
arbitration systems view consumers as customers as much as the
businesses they deal with.
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From: Flechtner, Harry
[mailto:FLECHTNER@LAW.PITT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 3:20 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Ken,
I like this conversation, which has deepened my understanding of
Gateway. I don't want to prolong it too much, but I can't resist
one final comment. You say that my suggestion for a consumer
form to turn the "terms-tables" on the vendor shouldn't work
because: "The two situations are not symmetrical. At the time the
customer places the order with Gateway, [the] customer knows
that Gateway's terms will be in the box, and that s/he has 30 days
to return." I doubt that the buyer is aware that there are terms
that can impact truly vital legal rights (can I sue in court?), that
won't be revealed until the goods arrive, and that then will
become legally binding. I doubt most buyers think about these
legal aspects at all. I suspect they think about the transaction in
line with traditional face-to-face dealings, and thus assume that
there is a deal when the order is placed on the phone. They may
well expect to be able to make a return, but not because there is
no deal yet (as under the Gateway analysis) but because the
vendor, as a matter of cultivating customer satisfaction (probably
forced on the vendor by competition), has a policy of taking
returns.
Certainly in the traditional purchase from a retail store, sellers
usually accept returns and the reason is a matter of store policy,
not the lack of a completed sale. That's why sellers can insist on
particular forms of documentation (a sales receipt) and might
limit the buyer's remedy to store credit or the like. In fact, I
think the UCC explicitly contemplates that the right to return
goods is fully consistent with having a previously-formed
contract. That would be a "sale on approval" under UCC 2-326.
I assume that formation of the contract in a sale on approval does
1168 [Vol 16
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/9
COMMON SENSE IN CONTRA CTS
not wait until the buyer has failed to exercise its right to return.
It seems clear to me that 2-326 contemplates that a sale on
approval contract is formed (and the terms of the original
contract determined) at least by the time the buyer receives the
goods.
Why the sale-on-approval model of the right-to-return goods
situation, a model that is explicitly adopted in Article 2, could
not be used to analyze the sale in Gateway is unclear to me. If it
had been used, Gateway's terms would be seen as an attempt to
modify an already-formed contract. They would not be binding
without more assent from the buyer than mere failure to exercise
the return option, which after all was part of the original sale-on-
approval contract. Indeed, on this model the buyer's failure to
return would not be an assent to anything not in the original
contract.
Harry Flechtner
From: Deborah Post
[mailto:dpost@WPPOST.DEPAUL.EDU']
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 7:58 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
I wish I could share your comments with my students. But first,
I would like to reserve the right to respond to some of the points
that have been made in the conversation we have been having.
We have gone from power to trust to assent. Personally, I think
we would be better off if we excised consent from this entire
discussion.
1. I believe that trust is important. I wrote about it in my short
piece "The Square Deal Furniture Company" in our casebook.
But this is a problem for students and at some level I am talking
about changing the response (consciousness) of the public
(represented by our students) on this issue. My students do not
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believe that we have a "right" to trust anyone, let alone other
participants in the market place. Nor do these students have
much "empathy." Absence of meaningful choice is about
powerlessness not about powerfulness. The two are linked but
one is more visible than the other. And fault is often assigned to
those who do not have power while it is seldom linked with the
existence of great power.
2. What is wealth and class? Can I give some examples that do
not involve monopoly power? Well, how about the wealthy
person who hires undocumented workers at below minimum
wage? There is plenty of competition for workers. Is this an
example of class and power? Or wealth and power? What if a
multinational corporation enters into a contract with a start-up
company that is developing technology and promises to fund
research and build planes using this technology? What if the
company is also building is own planes and one suspects that the
"joint venture agreement" might have been a way of tying up the
competition? And what if the contract included the standard "I
really am not promising you anything and if I don't build a thing
too bad for you" clause? Is that monopoly power or wealth?
(Boeing and Skyfox corp. 38 F.3d 1152 (1994))
3. I don't think we do our students a disservice by pointing to
the moral dimensions of any problem. I always like to call
attention to Corbin's somewhat naive view in contemporary times
that there are "mores" in the marketplace. Marketing by making
promises while you market while writing clauses that make it
impossible for anyone to ever hold you responsible for a crummy
product you turn out is immoral. Hey, if personal responsibility
is the hallmark of this era re: poor people, why is the merchant
class absolved of responsibility?
4. Power is a word that means many things but so is
reasonableness and Easterbrook's argument after all is that no
consumer reasonably could expect anything other than a contract
whose terms were imposed unilaterally by the seller with the
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consumer's only choice being return of the goods even before the
defects become known.
Thanks guys.
Deborah
From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDAHO.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 9:35 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
1. I confess I agree with the students regarding the right to trust.
Trust is an emotion, and it seems troublesome to say that I have a
right to have you conduct yourself in such a way that I can
subjectively enjoy a particular emotion. Again, if I have no right
to trust the politician I vote for, the newspaper I buy, the law
professor who tells me that the rule is X or Y, or the person I'm
taking out to dinner who says she enjoys my company, there
seems no obvious reason why I have a right to trust someone who
sells me a computer. Each of these people may have a moral
obligation not to engage in particular conduct that I might,
myself, consider to make them "untrustworthy," and I agree that
lying with regard to what you sell is immoral. But I don't see
how using my emotions rather than their conduct as the yardstick
for moral worth adds to the analysis.
2. There seems to be a contradiction running through some of
this discussion. If Gateway offers terms much more favorable
than the defaults found in the UCC (which it does), there seem to
be three possible explanations. Either (a) they are doing so
because they're wonderful people acting out of the goodness of
their hearts; or (b) they are forced by their competition to offer
these goodies as a way of attracting enough business to survive;
or (c) they simply feel that by offering this particular bundle of
rights (rather than the off-the-rack UCC scheme) they will attract
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people away from competitors who offer less attractive bundles.
If (a), then we hardly need worry that Gateway will act in an
underhanded fashion. If (b), then it's plain that Gateway doesn't
have the power to dictate terms, but rather that buyers have the
power to dictate terms by shopping for the most favorable among
competitors. If (c), then it seems that we ought to analyze
Gateway's entire offer (low price, reliable product, great
warranty, easy ordering, easy customization, liberal returns, free
delivery, free pickup and return of defective products, liberal
telephone technical support, arbitration clause) against the
standard UCC regime, which is obviously available to any buyer
who wants to walk down to Bill & Ted's Excellent Computer
Store. If we look at the entire transaction, it seems hard for me
to say that Gateway is less "moral" in this sense than Bill & Ted,
who build the product in the back room and whose sale is ended
when you walk out the door, unless the buyer wants to hire a
lawyer and sue on an implied warranty. I suppose no one would
argue that Bill & Ted have a legal obligation to provide all the
benefits Gateway does. So why should Gateway have to provide
the one benefit (ability for lawyers to make a lot of money on
class action lawsuits) that Bill & Ted have over Gateway?
3. It's hard to argue that an arbitration clause itself is
unconscionable, given that Congress has declared that the
national policy favors it. Where a particular arbitration clause
actually turns out to be truly unconscionable (as was Gateway's
ICC clause with the nonrefundable fee), courts have plenty of
tools to cut them down to reasonable size. The Brower court
quite sensibly did this.
- Frank
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From: Charles Knapp
[mailto:knappch@UCHASTINGS.EDUI
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 1:12 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
Okay, I guess I have to chime in at this point. It may well be
that Gateway is the greatest product since sliced bread and that
the market has rewarded this excellence by snapping up both its
product and its contract. (Recall Arthur Leff's "Contract as
Thing.") But to assert that Gateway has no obligation to include
in its contract-package "the one benefit (the ability for lawyers to
make a lot of money on class action lawsuits) that [its
competitors] have over Gateway" is to make the classic cart-
horse-positioning mistake. The legal system (including the dread
trial by jury) isn't something that Gateway, or State Farm
Insurance, or Bank of America, or any other business giant
allows us ordinary mortals to use (whether generously or
otherwise) as a matter of divine dispensation; it's our right as
citizens to have and use that system. Trial by jury in a public
courtroom existed before Gateway, and God willing will exist
after it. The question is rather under what circumstances the
Gateways of the world - excellent product or not - are entitled to
immunity from the public justice system, with the public access
and public accountability that this system entails. I think Jean
Braucher has hit the nail in precisely the right place - if
arbitration is so economically sound for everybody, then let the
consumer be persuaded "once the dispute has arisen" that
arbitration is in her best interests too. The argument that "but
then the consumer might have a lawyer" obviously proves too
much. That's the same as the argument against a Miranda
warning: We don't want people to have meaningful access to
knowledge of their rights, because then they might insist on
exercising them. And no, I'm not saying all consumers are
crooks. But then, neither are all criminal defendants. That's
why we have a legal system.
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Thanks for an intellectually challenging week, everybody.
Chuck Knapp
From: Spencer Neth [mailto:sxn6@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 1:58 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
This has been a wonderful discussion and is the sort of thing I
had hoped to see on the AALS list. I "taught" Gateway to my
students a few weeks ago, and I was not shy about giving my
opinions about the case, most of which are similar to those
expressed by Gergen.
1. Is it not strange that a conservative judge who normally argues
for reading statutes formalistically has ignored the language of
the UCC and at least 100 years of common law contract
formation law? There is absolutely no basis for saying that when
you call Gateway or Dell and order a computer you have not
entered into a contract. Your right to get out of the deal does not
mean it is not a contract. Getting out is not costless - as anyone
would know who opened the many boxes, assembled the parts,
attempted to install software and transfer files, only to find that
the computer does not have the features promised. In my class I
ask the students the question which Gergen puts - would Gateway
have the right to call you up a week after your call and tell you
that you will have to pay a higher price?
2. The intent of Gateway is not controlling. Remember the
objective theory of contract? It does not matter that Gateway
may not think it has a contract, the buyers reasonably think they
do.
3. Maybe a case can be made for forming contracts like UCITA -
although I don't think so unless there is a better way of policing
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the terms than there is now or is provided for by UCITA. In any
event, that is not what the UCC did, and it is just plain wrong for
a judge to distort the law of contract in order to reach what he
thinks is a good result. Deborah Post was right when she said:
"Power is a word that means many things but so is
reasonableness and Easterbrook's argument after all is that no
consumer reasonably could expect anything other than a contract
whose terms were imposed unilaterally by the seller with the
consumer's only choice being return of the goods even before the
defects become known. "
4. I have two sons who bought Gateway computers - both are
university trained computer science professionals. Both had
more than just annoying problems in getting Gateway to live up
to its promises. Indeed my one son still has an unused Gateway
computer that is a by product of a dispute with Gateway that
never was resolved. Incidentally, Gateway makes great
computers which they sell at a good price - but they don't
necessarily make good contracts.
5. Dell may not be any better. The Dell computer that I bought
in December came with a 4 page "terms and conditions" booklet
which I photocopied with the intent of handing out to my students
for class discussion. Paragraph 13 contains a clause that says all
disputes must be arbitrated by the National Arbitration Forum.
There is a reference to a web site, which I looked at briefly and
was impressed. However, I remember that the NAF - at least in
the past - had expensive and not very friendly procedures.
Furthermore, I believe it is for profit, or if not, it seems to be a
far different type of organization than the AAA. It mostly
arbitrates on a contract basis with companies like Dell - and if its
arbitrators decide too many cases in favor of the consumers they
will not be on the NAF list for long, for if the NAF arbitrations
are excessively unfavorable to Dell then Dell will not use its
services. How many customers of Dell would know anything
about the NAF and the dangers of such a clause? By the way, I
think Dell is otherwise a terrific company which makes a terrific
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product and provides wonderful customer service. But there has
to be some way of policing contracts of adhesion better than we
have now.
From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDAHO.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 5:35 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
I'm enjoying the thoughtful comments and I'm glad I signed up
for the list. Some thoughts:
1. With respect to the right to a jury trial, I agree with a lot of
what Professor Knapp says. I don't much like arbitration, and
think it's one of the shames of our current legal system that it's
become a viable option. (I confess I don't much care for the
current state of class action consumer suits either, chiefly because
the lawyers always seem to get the money while the consumer
ends up with a coupon good for 10% off the next pizza, not valid
with any other offer.) But it seems to me that this battle was lost
some time ago. The country's official policy is to encourage
arbitration. Therefore, it seems untenable to argue that an
arbitration clause ought to be treated differently than, for
example, a limitation of warranty clause. Of course, we might
choose to make a waiver of either a warranty or the right to a
jury trial illegal or unenforceable, or we might require specific
manifest assent for a waiver to be effective, but that's a different
issue.
2. With regard to Professor Neff s criticism of Judge
Easterbrook's judicial legislation, it seems to me that at this point
it's hard to make a convincing argument that judges ought to be
bound by immutable formal rules of contract which they cannot
limit or evade by creative construction, or that the UCC has
some kind of "plain meaning" that eliminates any room for
judicial interpretation. If the point is that Easterbrook seems
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inconsistent on this point, I might agree. If the point is that
judges should never engage in the kind of verbal legerdemain he
does, I might agree also. But I'd have to point out that most of
the creative, pro-buyer judicial activity of the last 40 years that
Professor Slawson praises in his book involves much the same
kind of judicial machete-work.
3. A question occurs to me. If the terms in Gateway's pamphlet
don't become part of the contract, which is oral and was formed
at the time of sale, are the pro-buyer promises made in it (the 30-
day return, the warranty, the help line, etc.) part of the contract?
If a customer has no actual knowledge of Gateway's 30-day
return policy, for example, at the time of the phone order, it
would seem that the return policy doesn't become part of the
contract. I'm not sure that the average consumer would think
herself better off under that interpretation.
Franklin G. Snyder
From: Scarberry, Mark
[mailto:mark.scarberry@PEPPERDINE.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 6:53 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Gateway
I get the list in digest form and thus it's hard for me to reply to a
particular post. Jean Braucher's post is intriguing. Under 2-
206(1)(b) we consider shipment of nonconforming goods to be an
acceptance which forms a K (if one had not already been formed)
precisely to prevent the seller from using the common law
argument that the buyer's non-return of the goods is an
acceptance of the counteroffer which the seller supposedly made
by shipment of nonconforming goods (the unilateral K trick).
Here the inclusion of the arbitration terms allows Gateway to
stick consumers with the nonconforming goods with no real
remedy.
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I also agree with Harry Flechtner that the consumer doesn't
assume when ordering by phone that that the seller can include
any terms the seller wants in the box with the computer. Perhaps
an empirical study would be helpful, but I feel confident of the
result. Further, the UCC allows oral contracts to be formed
without all details being settled; the obvious analysis then is that
gap fillers apply if needed, and if any party wants other more
detailed terms it can send proposals under 2-207. The whole
point of 2-207 is that keeping the goods is not an assent to the
additional terms, although for immaterial terms a failure to object
may constitute assent.
Also, Gateway does not pay return shipping when the buyer
decides not to keep the computer. At least that was true several
years ago. I ordered a "cutting edge" Gateway 486dx2-66; it
never worked right, and the 30 day period was about to expire.
Rather than trust that Gateway would eventually get it fixed, I
decided to return it. I had to pay the return shipping, which as I
recall was over $100. It also took some time to take it to the UPS
office and get it sent off. It certainly was not a cost-free out, and
I certainly did not think I was giving Gateway the right to impose
any terms it wished on me, with my only out being to pay over
$100 to get out of the contract by shipping the computer back.
Surely the correct analysis is that a K is formed orally on the
phone, or at least no later than when Gateway ships a computer.
The terms are those agreed to on the phone (or made available at
least somewhat prominently in whatever advertisement the buyer
is ordering from). 2-207 governs whether Gateway's additional
terms included in the box become part of the K. Per 2-207(2) an
onerous arbit clause is a material alteration and should not
become part of the K unless expressly agreed to by the buyer. A
fair arbit clause might or might not be considered a material
alteration. (I haven't looked at that question for a couple of
years, but don't some jurisdictions consider arbit to be per se a
material alteration and others take it on a case by case basis?)
The return privilege will be part of the K either because it is
stated by the salesperson on the phone, or because it is disclosed
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in ads seen by the buyer, or because it is now a custom in the
industry with respect to desktop computers. That makes it a sale
on approval under 2-326(1), which then obligates Gateway to pay
the return shipping (unless otherwise agreed) under 2-327(1)(c).
An additional term shifting the shipping expense to the buyer
should be a material term that does not become part of the
contract. From 2-327(1)(c) and the comment to 2-327 it seems
that a consumer buyer need do nothing other than notify the
seller of the election to return the goods. I suppose though that
we all understand sellers expect us to put such goods in the hands
of a carrier (the book of the month club approach is probably
now genetically ingrained). I suppose that is now a custom. But
there is no custom that buyers pay return shipping. (Think again
of the book of the month club.) Thus Gateway should still be
obligated to pay shipping, which it apparently refuses to do when
a buyer wants to return the whole system for a refund. Note also
that risks in shipping should be on Gateway under 2-327(1).
And I don't suppose any of us need to be reminded that the
acceptance spoken of in 2-327(1)(b) is not acceptance of an offer,
but just acceptance of the goods, which should not affect the
terms of the K, beyond eliminating the return option. I suppose
internet orders will be treated differently, because the seller will
have a button on the web page saying "Click here to see detailed
terms." Buyers who don't want to be bound by those terms will I
suppose either need to try to negotiate them out (fat chance) or
claim unconscionability.
Mark S. Scarberry
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From: Stephen J. Ware [mailto:sjware@SAMFORD.EDU]
Sent: Saturday, February 12, 2000 1:53 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: abuse of power, Gateway, and "pay now, terms
later"
On Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:12:18 -0800 Charles Knapp
<knappch@UCHASTINGS.EDU> wrote:
Trial by jwy in a public courtroom existed before Gateway, and
God willing will exist after it. The question is rather under what
circumstances the Gateways of the world - excellent product or
not - are entitled to immunity fi'om the public justice system, with
the public access and public accountability that this system
entails. I think Jean Braucher has hit the nail in precisely the
right place - if arbitration is so economically sound for
eve ybody, then let the consumer be persuaded "once the dispute
has arisen" that arbitration is in her best interests too. The
argument that "but then the consumer might have a lawyer"
obviously proves too much. That's the same as the argument
against a Miranda warning: We dont want people to have
meaningfid access to knowledge of their rights, because then they
might insist on exercising them.
I suspect that enforcement of pre-dispute "take-it-or-leave-it"
arbitration clauses is in the interests of consumers as a class,
while it would typically be against a particular consumer's
interests to agree to arbitration once a dispute has arisen.
That is because I believe arbitration lowers prices. Arbitration
reduces a business's costs, just like a technological advance or a
better way of organizing an assembly line reduces a business's
costs. Anything that reduces costs to business ultimately reduces
the prices charged to consumers. That's Economics 101, as well
as plain common sense about how competition works. And it
does not rely on the assumption that consumers understand, or
even read, form contracts. (See STEPHAN J. WARE, Consuner
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Abitration as Eceptional Consuner Law, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 195, 212 n. 25 (1998)).
For consumers as a class, it may well be that the lower prices
resulting from arbitration clauses are worth giving up the post-
dispute leverage that comes from having a right to litigate, rather
than arbitrate. Post-dispute, on the other hand, the price for
giving up that leverage increases dramatically because the
probability of a dispute has risen from very low to 1. In other
words, it is entirely rational for a consumer to prefer, at the time
of contracting, that an arbitration clause be in the contract even
if, at the time of the dipute, the consumer prefers that an
arbitration clause not be in the contract.
To put a finer point on it, the question of arbitration clauses in
form contracts may cut differently for different consumers. If
you're the sort of consumer who is especially likely to have a
claim against Gateway then you may be better off if form
arbitration clauses are unenforceable. But if you're the run-of-
the-mill consumer who is extremely unlikely to have a claim
against Gateway then you're probably better off with the current
law enforcing these clauses.
Finally I note at least two possible reasons why arbitration lowers
a business' cost: (1) arbitration reduces the cost of decision
(damage awards and settlement payments), and (2) arbitration
reduces the cost of getting the decision. Only the first reason is a
cost to consumers that may, for some, outweigh the benefits of
lower prices. The second reason is a cost to lawyers, not to
consumers. To the extent the second reason is significant,
consumers and businesses both win from arbitration.
Steve
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From: Alan Hyde
[mailto:Alan.Hyde@WORLDNET.ATT.NET]
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2000 2:32 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: trust
Like Deborah Post, I'd like to hear how people raise the issue of
trust in class. Trust, as defined by Hobbes, is an observable
behavior, or more accurately the absence of behavior: the
absence of the kind of self-protective behavior that you would
normally expect of someone in like circumstances. (See Thomas
Hobbes, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University
Press 1996) (1651)). As such, it cuts across the contracts
curriculum; it is potentially implicated in all invocations of the
trite argument "If it was so important to them, why didn't they
provide for it?" When this argument is not a show-stopper, it is
because the answer implicates some version of trust behavior
(Hobbes: they didn't provide for it because they trusted their
contracting party not to make it necessary). Trust, so defined, is
obviously not an "emotion" and is the sort of thing that is
routinely contracted for, in special contracts under that name,
that have their own place in the curriculum. The present issue is
sensitizing students and others to the role trust plays in ordinary
commercial activity, not denominated "trust agreements." There
is a fair economic literature on this and., as the book by Francis
Fukuyama (TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY, (June 1996), or Hobbes' book, for that matter)
shows, it is not a particular concern of the political left.
I don't, however, think that it has anything at all to do with
issues of power. Trust occurs between those both equal or
disparate in power. In fact, Deborah, I wonder whether your
students reject the importance of trust because you link it to the
power issue. If they somehow infer that trust is something
widows and orphans do, while the big boys protect themselves,
then they can be forgiven for wanting to play with the big boys
and not the widows and orphans. So one key to introducing the
idea is to show how big boys, too, leave contractual duties
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vague, agree to language apparently against their interests, etc.
because they trusted the other (and had good reason to do so).
I don't much raise these issues in connection with assent, which
is complicated enough, as this week's postings show. This is just
a pedagogical choice however. Obviously if you think there's a
doctrine of "reasonable expectations," you have to confront the
choice of what those are, and that implicates the question of the
socially observable and/or desirable level of trust. (I think that
doctrine barely exists and have always agreed with the late Art
Leff that it's normally reasonable to expect that the one who
drafted the form attempted to take as much as it could).
I always raise them to give meaning to Hadley v. Baxendale's
limitation of damages to the foreseeable. That court asserts quite
confidently that the carrier couldn't [be expected to] foresee a
mill shut down; it could only foresee a mill with a spare shaft
held in reserve. What kind of statement is that? A finding of
fact about the expectations of carriers? A rule of law? A
reification of what someone thinks is desirable commercial
behavior into a universalized aspiration? A reflection of the
judge's commercial practice?
The first year I used the Dawson book, Hadley was followed by
five or six note cases that illustrated every flavor of
"foreseeability": tacit agreement, on the cards, 2-716 reason to
know. I quickly realized that my Rutgers students, who fear
conflict and do not read well, had absolutely no idea that these
were competing interpretations; they thought all the notes were
somehow saying the same thing. To bring order to the chaos, I
began drawing a chart on the board, arranging the different
formulas for foreseeability along a line from minimum liability
(theoretically, I'm liable only for what I agreed to. The closest
we've come in US law is tacit agreement: I'm liable only for
what I tacitly agreed to), on through liable for what I was told,
for what I knew, for what I probably knew, for what I should
have known, and on to another version that isn't law, for what I
should have thought of had I been a Kantian moralist who always
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acts on generalizable duties and is certainly aware that people are
depending on me to do what I said I would! I take to labeling the
first pole "Chicago" and the second pole "Woodstock." Few
students really want to live consistently at either pole. All can
see that one could live at many different places on the spectrum;
we discuss the kinds of rhetorical appeals that drive people in
particular circumstances to feeling more Chicagoish today
("People really ought to look out for themselves in these
circumstances and not expect others to") or more Woodstockish
("People who promise things really ought to think about how
others are depending on them"). Time spent on this repays
itself; we reuse the framework throughout the semester.
What do other people do?
I should say that (as my earlier message implied) I don't think
that having contractual duties turn on disparity of power ever
makes much sense, for reasons well-pointed out by Duncan
Kennedy, or Alan Schwartz's old models of monopolists and
consumers. So when I say that the issue of trust should be kept
separate from the issue of "bargaining power" and the like, I'm
giving away something I don't believe in anyway.
Alan Hyde
From: Alan Hyde
[mailto:Alan.Hyde@WORLDNET.ATT.NET]
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2000 2:41 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: assent in consumer transactions
I'm blown away by Mark Gergen's UCC analysis and wonder
only if there's any case law support for the application to
consumer transactions. It seems to me that the reality is that
consumers and small businesses - buyers who don't have their
own forms, but who just phone or write or email orders from
catalogs - normally make offers; the offers are accepted when the
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seller acknowledges or ships; and that the terms of the resulting
contract are the seller's form terms (warranties, arbitration, etc.)
Such buyers occasionally (rarely) get a specific form term
knocked out as unconscionable or violative of fair credit or the
like. But I never heard of a buyer getting them all knocked out
on the grounds that under 2-207, seller's additional terms were
never any more than proposals.
Precisely what's bothered me about 2-207 is the distinction that I
always thought it made - that I think it does make in practice -
between buyers-with-forms (businesses big enough to have form
purchase orders) and buyers-without-forms (consumers and
smaller businesses that just order things on the phone). I thought
- and I thought the cases support - that only buyers-with-forms
raise 2-207 issues, while buyers-without-forms do not. I now see
that 2-206 and 2-207 may be read not to create this distinction.
But I think that all the courts follow the clear suggestion of 2-
207's official comment, and do limit it to battle of the forms (that
is, buyers-with-forms). Are there cases the other way?
Alan Hyde
From:Linzer,Peter [Plinzer@UH.edu]
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2000 3:42 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Click wrap, power, trust and the American Way
of Life
I've been out of the loop this last week, so I hadn't read the
exchange until this morning, when I read all 30 (!) messages (not
counting those on tenure - by the way, the term is "untenured,"
not "pretenured." Leave that to the right-to-lifers ("preborn
fetuses").
We owe great thanks to Deborah Post for being the spiritual
creator of this list serve and an incalculable debt to Carol
Chomsky for doing the hard work in managing it. I'm sure there
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are others who deserve thanks as well. The list serve is the
biggest (the only?) contribution the section has made to the
teaching of contracts in the 24 years I've been taking part in it.
Much as I agree with a lot of Deborah's social views, I see the
poor consumer issue as one that should be handled as a poor
consumer matter rather than a contract matter, precisely because
the autonomy that you and I and Richard Epstein really do have
is largely absent in Mrs. Williams's case. (As Stewart pointed
out about ten years ago, no one knows what happened to Mrs.
Williams. She exists as a figure in a myth. A sort of unicorn
that we all love but can't find in the real world. And given the
political change, I wonder if today's Mrs. Ws do as well [sic] as
she did.)
But the issue that we were talking about - the gateway issue, has
nothing to do with the poor consumers. Most computer users
have a fair amount of education and have a couple of thousand
bucks or more to spend. My wife, Rhea Stevens, is a lawyer and
the daughter of a computer pioneer, and has dealt with computers
since she was a child. Nonetheless, she and I, with five degrees
between us, have been involved with about half a dozen computer
disputes - with IBM, Micron and Gateway, among others. We
have done pretty well, but bringing in a contracts professor and a
contracts lawyer who understands computers intimately, is hardly
what most users can do.
The issue is over assent. Is it needed and can it exist in a mass
consumer transaction? I don't want to rehearse the fight that
Jean Braucher led, successfully, against former Article 2B at the
American Law Institute, but the ALI expressly disapproved of
the clickwrap assent mechanism, and many of the computer trade
papers and trade associations oppose UCITA (the current
manifestation of 2B) largely because of the assent question,
however it is worded. The person who hits the "do you agree?"
button while installing software isn't assenting to anything. First
of all, he is usually a computer geek from the mailroom who
would not be given the authority to sign a certified mail receipt,
much less assent to hidden terms in a closely written license.
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Second, even if it is the user who installs, hardly anyone is going
to stop and spend half an hour reading and trying to understand
the license. Third, even if the user does learn of the provision
within thirty days, the cost and inconveniences described by
Harry Fletchner and Spencer Neth make return much too
expensive for what at the point is an unlikely scenario.
While it is possible to fit the disputes into 2-207 as Mark
Scarberry did so well, I agree with Stewart Macaulay and Dave
Slawson, among others, in finding that some sort of overview,
such as the reasonable expectations doctrine, or a notion of
fairness is needed. That this smells of tort bothers me not at all.
The whole battle of the forms is a fiction since as it would be
completely inefficient to have a lawyer read every shipping
document in ordinary trade; it's worse when someone not in the
trade (whether consumer or small businessman) is clicking on the
installation button. To Ken Kettering's concerns about the death
of contract, my response is "so what?" Karl Lewellyn made a
suggestion somewhat like Mark Gergen's quasi-seal idea in 1939.
When he made the distinction between dickered terms and those
the buyer agrees to on the understanding that they would screw
him. The clickwrap arbitration, choice of forum, after sale
modification and similar terms all screw the buyer, that's why
they shouldn't be enforced.
Peter
From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDARO.EDU]
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 9:53 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: trust & 2-207
Three points:
1. Perhaps the disagreement over "trust" comes from differing
terminology. With apologies to Hobbes, the ability to predict
what a reasonable contracting partner will do in the future isn't
"trust" in the traditional sense of putting one's faith in the
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character and integrity of another - it's merely a recognition that
people usually act predictably. Holmes's Bad Man, for example,
relied on the court system, not because he "trusted" it, but
because he recognized that courts were likely to act in predictable
ways. If that's all we mean by "trust," my only disagreement is
that I don't see that casting this as A's personal right to put faith
and belief in what she thinks B will do adds much to the analysis.
And I'm still puzzled why there would be a legal right to "trust"
the person who sells you something (when you know clearly that
person is dealing with you for an express pecuniary motive) but
not a right to "trust" newspapers, politicians, and law professors,
who usually claim to be acting disinterestedly in our own good.
2. One difficulty with 2-207 is that an acceptance that adds
additional terms doesn't operate as an acceptance if it is
"expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms." It seems hard to believe that Gateway would be
unsophisticated enough not to make its acceptance expressly
conditional.
3. With respect to when the contract springs into existence,
suppose Gateway tells its phone reps to have the following
conversation with a new purchaser:
Q. Thank you for your order, Mr. Wilberforce. Now, you
understand that you have 30 days to return the computer, no
questions asked?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understand that there is no legal contract
between us until you've had a full 30 days to decide whether you
like the computer and accept our offer?
A. Sure.
Q. So that neither of us has a legal obligation to each other
until you've had time to get comfortable with the computer and
decide whether you want to keep it?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Now, in the package with the computer you'll find the
booklet that contains all of the terms of our contract. Please
make sure you read them carefully. If you object to any of them,
merely return the computer, no questions asked. If you decide to
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keep the computer, those will be terms of the contract. Is that all
right?
A. Fine.
Would this obviate all these formal issues we're talking about? If
so, what would be the practical point of requiring Gateway to go
through this hoop?
Frank
From: Carol Chomsky
[mailto:choms001@MAROON.TC.UMN.EDU]
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 10:24 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: assent in consumer transactions (from Jay Mootz)
This message is being forwarded for Jay Mootz, who couldn't get
it on the listserv directly:
The "problem" with a 2-207 analysis of Gateway is that the
additional terms will never become part of the contract under 2-
207(2) because the contract is not "between merchants."
Easterbrook's opinion in Gateway suggests that this result is
unrealistic (surely a sin under Article 2), and that both the
consumer and the seller anticipate that there will be a number of
terms to the deal beyond those established during the phone
conversation and those provided by statutory gap fillers. This
seems right, as I expect the Hills were counting on receiving
warranties and service terms in the shipment that they could
enforce against Gateway. Easterbrook's solution is to treat the
written terms in the box as an offer that is accepted by retaining
the goods, but this is rather artificial. Another possible solution
is that the parties show their agreement by conduct under 2-
207(3), but this also doesn't seem to match reality since both
parties undoubtedly believe that they have expressly contracted.
The layered contract approach is closer to reality, but allows us
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to avoid the real problem of the "surprise" that buyers face with
regard to some of terms included in the box.
I agree, then, with those who have suggested that the only
plausible answer to the Gateway "problem" is that the terms in
the box must be substantively regulated by legislatures or courts.
Unconscionability and good faith can be stretched for this
purpose, but not very effectively. The bottom line is that Article
2 just doesn't address this problem, which demands a new
approach that is not framed in terms of the traditional test of
showing agreement. The "doctrine of reasonable expectations"
in insurance law is too often construed by courts as nothing more
than "super contra proferentem," but some of the more ambitious
articulations of the doctrine strike me as providing a plausible
approach. The answer to industry critics of this approach would
be simple: they are free to disrupt the reasonable expectations of
the consumer by obtaining their genuine, express assent to terms
they seek. Unfortunately, courts are backing away from
reasonable expectations in insurance law cases, and are very
unlikely to pursue this approach to contracts for the sale of
goods.
I can't decide if I have said anything new, but I have benefited
from the discussion. Thanks to all.
Jay Mootz
From: Linzer, Peter [mailto:PLinzer@UH.EDU]
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 5:41 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: trust & 2-207
If Gateway tells its phone solicitors to say:
"And you understand that there is no legal contract between us
until you've had a full 30 days to decide whether you like the
computer and accept our offer?" it better get a new lawyer. Of
course there is a contract. What are the shipment of the
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computer and the payment of thousands of dollars, a bailment
and a gift? In fact, there is a contract with a condition that it can
be canceled within 30 days. The question remains what are the
terms,who agreed to what (and how), and do we care about
assent after all?
From: Scarberry, Mark
[mailto:mark.scarberry@PEPPERDINE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 1:04 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
Frank Snyder and Jay Mootz (among others) make some
interesting and insightful points. I don't agree with Frank,
though, that Gateway can prevent a K from being formed by
including language in the box to the effect that Gateway's
acceptance is expressly conditioned on the buyer's assent to
Gateway's terms. If a K is formed orally (on the phone), then
acceptance has already occurred, and Gateway can't unmake the
K by including such language in its papers in the box. If a K isn't
formed orally, then Gateway's shipping of the goods is
presumably the acceptance under 2-206(1)(b) (an acceptance of
the "order or other offer" made orally by the buyer on the
phone). Even if you don't want to get that formalistic with offer
and acceptance, a K will still be recognized as having been
formed. Assuming Gateway charges the buyer's credit card with
the buyer's consent when it ships the computer, then, as Peter
Linzer pointed out, there has been both payment and shipment,
which ought to suffice under 2-204(1) and/or 2-207(3). I think
language tracking the 2-207(1) "no acceptance unless you
expressly assent to my terms" language is ineffective unless
communicated to the buyer before the time of shipment (or at
least in time for the buyer to refuse delivery of the shipment).
I also think that many of these contracts may be between
merchants, thus allowing additional terms to become part of the
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K under 2-207(2) despite Jay's important reminder of the
"between merchants" language in 2-207(2).
Many computer purchases are for small business or home office
use. If the buyer is in business, then arguably he or she is a
merchant with respect to issues such as negotiation and formation
of contracts. See Comment 2 to § 2-104, which states that for
purposes of 2-207 and similar sections any person in business is a
merchant. (Note that 2-104(1) includes as merchants persons who
by their occupation hold themselves out as having knowledge
peculiar to the practices involved, which for purposes of 2-204,
2-206, and 2-207 is arguably the formation of contracts.)
If the Gateway rep has the conversation with the customer which
Jay posits, then I have no problem holding the buyer to the
conscionable provisions in the box. But if the buyer decides not
to keep the computer, it will be Gateway's obligation to pay for
its return, absent agreement otherwise in the phone conversation.
And I don't think Gateway wants to ship computers on such an
iffy basis, with an obligation to pay return shipping. (And
perhaps also with no right to charge the customer's credit card
even for the shipping to the customer unless the customer decides
to keep the computer.)
If Gateway says (in addition to the things in Jay's dialogue),
"We'll charge your credit card on shipment, and you will have to
pay shipping both ways if you don't want to keep the computer
after you read our terms," and if the customer says "OK"
(trusting Gateway not to include overly abusive terms), then I
would hold the customer to that agreement (subject to
unconscionability analysis).
Thank you to everyone who has participated in this thread. It's
been two years since I've taught contracts, but I'll be teaching it
again next year. This has been helpful to me to get back into the
subject.
Mark S. Scarberry
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From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDAHO.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 1:13 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
I appreciate the thoughtfulness of this discussion; I'm learning a
lot. I'm in agreement with most of Mark Scarberry's points.
We certainly can view the contract as completely final as to its
terms when the telephone call ends, or when the goods are
shipped. (Although both Hill and Brower expressly hold that
there's no contract at either point.) But it's not intuitively
obvious that this must necessarily be the case, even if we view
the buyer as the offeror. If Gateway sent the additional terms as
a "written confirmation" of the oral contract before shipping, and
expressly made its acceptance conditional on those terms, it
would seem to be a clear case. Shipping the papers and the
hardware at the same time might make a difference, but I'm not
sure why it would.
Take, for example, airline tickets. Granted, they don't fall under
Article 2, but we still have a buyer negotiating some terms on the
telephone (route, price, seat) and then getting the fine print later.
As the Supreme Court held in Carnival Cruise, the contract isn't
merely the terms dickered on the telephone; the fine print on the
ticket when it arrives is part of the deal, which is consummated
when the purchaser uses the ticket. There seems no obvious
reason to me to treat a big company that sells $1500 airline
tickets over the phone differently than a big company that sells
$1500 computers over the phone, at least absent some language
compelling that result. So it's hard for me to see why 2-207
should get a narrower reading.
Frank
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From: Thomas Joo [mailto:twjoo@UCDAVIS.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 1:27 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: trust & 2-207
Professor Linzer writes:
"In fact, there is a contract with a condition that it can be
canceled within 30 days."
Another way to look at it is as an option contract. The Buyer has
purchased an option to accept Gateway's offer to sell the
computer - the terms of G's offer are those disclosed during the
phone conversation. After the option K is created, G cannot alter
the terms of its offer to sell. That's the whole point of an option,
after all (a similar point was made in an earlier post that argued
G could not change the sale price of the computer after the phone
call).
Gateway might say there is no consideration to make the option
enforceable, so G can change any terms it wants (including the
price).
Well, I would respond, the consideration is incorporated into the
shipping & handling cost Buyer promises to pay - this cost is
presumably nonrefundable. (Buyer also promises to pay to ship
the computer back if she declines to exercise the option). (I put a
similar problem on my midterm exam, and a few students
actually got this point.)
Tom Joo
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From: Jean Braucher
[mailto:braucher@NT.LAW.ARIZONA.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 2:31 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
Airlines and insurance companies are often used as examples of
businesses that send terms after you order and pay, but these are
both heavily regulated industries. Try looking at what comes
with the airline ticket - it is mostly stuff required by federal
regulation (no smoking and exit-row seating restrictions) or
international treaty (Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol
Amendment, and the like). Insurance contracts have to be
submitted to state insurance commissioners for review, and
usually there are requirements for a simplified disclosure of key
terms before a policy sale can be closed. If we had a state
computer commissioner or a federal software administration,
airlines and insurance might be good analogies for computer and
software transactions.
The Gateway problem was discussed at the recent Revised
Article 2 meeting. At one point drafting committee chair Bill
Henning went around the room and asked all the seller
representatives to comment on the importance of protecting terms
sent after order and payment (with a shipment). The only one
who thought it was important was the Gateway lawyer. The
others all said it wasn't a business model they would use. My
guess is that Revised 2 will be silent on the issue - and let all of
us have fun with it for years to come (although Internet sales
probably will eliminate the issue - easy enough to get agreement
before shipment, or download, in that setting - which is another
reason not to address the Gateway issue in a statute now, UCITA
notwithstanding).
Jean
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From: Dave Slawson [mailto:dslawson@LAW.USC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 5:09 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
This is in response to Jean Braucher's most recent comments.
Although insurance is regulated in every state, the regulation is
nowhere nearly enough to provide any reasonable assurance that
policy provisions are fair. The courts have always had to play
the major role in this respect. One reason is that the state
commissions were set up deliberately to be weak in most cases,
and in all cases they are hobbled by statutes drafted by insurance-
industry lobbyists intended to limit their powers. Another
reason, I think, is that case by case adjudication is simply
superior to administrative review for identifying instances of
injustice and doing something effective about them. Anyway, it
was the courts and not the commissions that created all the major
protections of the consumer in insurance: reasonable expectations
and all the rules sounding in tort (such as "bad faith breach" and
the "duty to settle") that override anything said to the contrary in
insurance policies.
David Slawson
From: Scarberry, Mark
[mailto:Mark.Scarberry@PEPPERDINE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 16, 2000 11:57 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
I'm not sure how Frank thinks the case comes out if Gateway
sends a. written confirmation before shipping (and includes
language stating that "This does not constitute an acceptance
unless you assent to our terms").
Suppose the Gateway rep says to the buyer on the phone, "Now
you understand that when we end this call we will have a binding
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agreement, subject to your right to return the computer within 30
days?" and the buyer responds, "Yes." Then the call ends. Then
Gateway sends such a confirmation. That confirmation can't
unmake the contract that has already been formed, can it?
Gateway is obligated to ship a computer whether or not the buyer
assents to Gateway's confirmation's terms. In other words, as I
see it, the inclusion of the phrase "written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time" in 2-207(1) is the result of poor
drafting; it was not meant to allow a party to unilaterally annul a
contract that has already been formed.
If I'm wrong on that point, is it because the (presumably) oral
contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and thus the
confirmation is a necessary part of making the contract
enforceable? But that doesn't seem right. The Code otherwise
treats K formation and the defense of the statute of frauds as
separate issues. Cf. 2-201(3)(b). And the confirmation might be a
confirmation of an informal written agreement (as Comment 1 to
2-207 states), in which case there might already be a sufficient
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds under 2-201(1).
So I'm left thinking that confirmations have no role in K
formation under 2-207(1) but only a role in determining the terms
of the contract.
Mark S. Scarberry
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From: Burnham, Scott [mailto:sburnham@selway.umt.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, February 16 2000
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Magnuson-Moss
In the discussion of Gateway, there has been no mention as yet of
Magnuson-Moss. Because the computer is a consumer product,
and because Gateway offers a written warranty, it surely applies.
Curiously, Judge Easterbrook alluded to the Act in Gateway, but
said that it was the responsibility of the Hills to request the
warranty information. I don't read it that way.
The Act seems particularly relevant because it was supposed to
improve the warranty marketplace not through regulation but
through disclosure. The theory was that if manufacturers clearly
disclosed warranty terms, consumers would shop for the best
terms, and marketplace competition would lead manufacturers to
offer better terms.
In order for such a system to work, the warranty terms have to
be clearly disclosed prior to the sale. The drafters realized this,
and the regulations enacted by the FTC state that "the seller of a
consumer product with a written warranty shall make a text of
the warranty readily available for examination by the prospective
buyer..." There are specific instructions for catalog and mail
order sales.
The Act also encourages informal dispute settlement procedures,
but the mechanism also has to be stated on the warranty and it
has to meet standards established by the FTC.
Because the regulations were written before oral or web-based
orders became commonplace, it would make sense for the FTC
to add another section establishing the procedures for making the
warranty terms known in such a transaction. But it would
certainly be a reasonable interpretation of the Act that failure to
disclose the terms prior to the sale was a violation of the Act.
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Because attorneys fees may be recovered for violations of the
Act, plaintiffs seeking a private remedy would be crazy not to
allege violations as part of their complaint. If they are hoping for
a remedy without private action, they should complain to the
FTC.
Scott
From: Clark Remington
[mailto:CREMINGT@PCM.BROOKLAW.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 11:37 AM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: True life clickwrap adventures
The discussion about shrink-wrap/click-wrap acceptances has
been fascinating. A premise of the vendor's argument is that the
offeree consents by not returning the item or by clicking yes.
We are to imagine that one of the offeree's options is to NOT
accept. My thinking about this subject was forever changed
when I read Geoffrey Bennett's carefully documented story of his
attempt to decline acceptance of the "End User License
Agreement for Microsoft Software" and return it for a refund.
(See Toshiba/Microsoft Saga, (visited Feb. 1, 2001)
<http://www.netcraft.com.au/geoffrev/toshiba.html >). I am as
big a supporter of the idea of consent as you are likely to find
teaching contracts these days, but Bennett's story has caused me
to examine claims about consent very carefully.
I have attached Bennett's story, which I pulled from his web site
last year. It is in Word Perfect format. I highly recommend
giving it a read.
Clark Remington
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From: Jonathan Hyman
[mailto:jhyman@ANDROMEDA.RUTGERS.EDI]
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 12:32 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Trust in contracts
The thread on trust in contracts brings to mind some of the
material on cultural differences in negotiating. Some of the
literature says that Asian negotiators (particularly Japanese) tend
to look at negotiations as the start of an ongoing relationship in
which the details will be worked out and problems will be
addressed as they come up. As a result, much of the negotiation
process involves events that are as much social as business, to get
to know the other parties. Assessing the degree one can trust the
others is the key task in negotiating in this manner. The resulting
written agreement tends to be rather short and general.
American negotiators, by contrast, look for a much more
detailed, fully spelled out agreement, and tend to see the
negotiation process as the verbal give and take needed to
construct such detail, not a very social way to relate to others.
And in this kind of negotiation, one may not consciously attend
to the extent trust is of concern. Trust might remain unstated and
unarticulated in the background.
Is trust always present in negotiations (and in the contracts that
result from them) to a greater or lesser degree? The legal action
would then turn on its degree. If that is so, then a court trying to
resolve later disputes has some choice as to the extent it will
emphasize the trust aspect of the transaction.
Jonathan Hyman
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From: Spencer Neth [mailto:sxn6@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 3:19 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: assent in consumer transactions
In the hope that interest in the Gateway problem has not died, or
at least is capable of being revived (it is an extremely important
topic which should be of interest to all lawyers) I add the
following:
1. Every year in my commercial law course I spend 1-2 hours
discussing the Gateway problem and 1-2 hours discussing
Magnuson-Moss. I am embarrassed that I did think to put them
together. As Scott Bernham points out, it would seem clear that
the act bars conclusive arbitration, at least with respect to
consumer purchasers (although the act as a whole also applies to
non consumer purchasers of a "consumer good"), and at least
with respect to claims under the written warranties. I think that a
good case can be made that the bar would also apply to claims
under implied warranties, for which Magnuson-Moss does give a
cause of action. Boyd v. Homes of Legend, 981 F. Supp. 1423
(M.D. Ala., 1997), says it applied only with respect to claims on
the written warranties, but I disagree, and so long as you can get
to court on the written warranties there may not be much
practical problem here.
2. There really should not be any argument about when the
contract in Gateway was formed, and as many have pointed out
the real question is what are the terms. Magnuson-Moss was
supposed to enable consumers to know the warranty terms before
they contracted, and in that way maybe there would be some
chance to shop around for the best warranty, thus subjecting
warranties to market forces of competition. This would seem
realistic when it comes to micro computers which have become
something close to a commodity item. I might have purchased a
Gateway rather than a Dell if Gateway did not have the Dell
American Arbitration Forum clause, and if I did not know from
my son's experience that Gateway is difficult to deal with if you
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have a complaint and going to court was not a practical
alternative.
3. The reason that Gateway or any one else can use the courts to
enforce language in a document which it has drafted against
others is assent. Finding meaningful assent is often a problem,
as others on the list have pointed out, even in the situations
where the buyer has signed the form or clicked his assent. This,
however, is no reason to ignore total lack of meaningful assent,
but rather a reason for the law to develop some other means of
policing contract terms, e.g. Professor Slawson's idea of
reasonable expectations.
From: Franklin G. Snyder [mailto:fsnyder@UIDAHO.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 3:30 PM
To: aalscontracts@tc.umn.edu
Subject: Re: Gateway
Perhaps I'm too literal, but it seems to me that a "written
confirmation" must necessarily refer to a confirmation of an
agreement reached orally or by informal correspondence.
(That's what Comment 1 seems to say.) As I read 2-207, in that
situation the different terms in the written confirmation, if made
expressly conditional, do seem to "unmake" the agreement.
The way around this might be the language in comment 2, which
says that this analysis doesn't apply to a "proposed deal which in
commercial understanding has in fact been closed." If we say
that "in commercial understanding" everyone knows the contract
for the computer is closed at the time someone says "yes" on the
phone, the terms would fall under 2-207(2) as proposals for
addition, and presumably they don't come in. But it's hard for
me to view the sale as "closed" at this point, because Gateway
doesn't seem to think it is, several judges don't seem to think it
is, and (for the reasons set out in the next paragraph) I suspect
the customer doesn't either. I think that this is where I part
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company with Mark and others, although I recognize the force of
their analysis.
In support of my reading, though, I note that if we assume
Gateway's additional terms fall under 2-207(2) as "proposals for
addition," they presumably only come in if the buyer assents.
But that would mean that none of the additional terms (30-day
right of return, extended warranty, phone support, etc.) would
come into the contract unless there's some manifestation of assent
by the buyer. (Unless they're discussed on the phone or we
strain to get them in as implicit terms due to prior advertising.)
The customer's silent acceptance of the computer won't do as
assent, because if silence were acceptance the arbitration clause
would come in, too. It seems to me that the buyer expects to get
the whole Gateway package promised in the literature, and would
not be happy with a price term, a quantity term, a shipping term,
and a host of UCC defaults. So I'm not sure the customer would
view the deal as "closed" based solely on the telephone terms.
Frank
From: Scarberry, Mark
[mailto:Mark.Scarberry@PEPPERDINE.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 1:55 PM
To: AALSCONTRACTS@TC.UMN.EDU
Subject: Re: Gateway
White & Summers cite (and agree with) American Parts Co. v.
Am. Arbit. Ass'n, 154 NW2d 5 (Mich App 1967), and Album
Graphics v. Beatrice Foods, 408 NE2d 1041 (Ill. App. 1980) for
the proposition that confirmations cannot be expressly conditional
on assent to their terms so as to unmake a contract that was
already formed. "A party should not be able to escape an oral
contract through a confirmation." White & Summers, UCC (5th
ed 2000), § 1-3 at 44, n.45. I think they're right, and I know of
no contrary authority (although I'll admit I haven't looked for
any) other than the language of 2-207(1) itself. And it is possible
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to give a literal reading to 2-207(1) that is consistent with White
& Summers. Suppose a confirmation of an oral agreement or
informal written agreement includes different or additional terms
and states: "This is not effective as an acceptance unless you
assent to our terms." Then under 2-207(1) the confirmation is
not effective as an acceptance. But who cares? A contract has
already been formed, and thus no acceptance is needed.
That interpretation of 2-207(1) makes superfluous the reference
in 2-207(1) to confirmations. We all know that courts tend to
disfavor such interpretations. But I think legislative drafters often
include phrases for emphasis or out of confusion, with no intent
that courts give additional meaning to the statute because of the
inclusion of the phrase.
Mark S. Scarberry
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